

# The perception of Ukrainian identity during Euromaidan in Polish opinion-making press

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The public protests in Ukraine during autumn 2013 and winter 2014, which were called Euromaidan, seem to be a new stage in the construction of Ukrainian identity. In general, they were considered as an attempt to challenge the entire post-Soviet system in Ukraine<sup>1</sup>. In short, the demonstrations, which had started in response to the refusal of the Ukrainian government to sign the EU Association agreement, resulted in the complex protest against the political order in Ukraine, which functioned according to the post-Soviet habits of ruling elites.

However, it is worth emphasizing that the process of identity construction is not made solely *per se*. Identity, especially collective, is often explored in intergroup relations<sup>2</sup>. Therefore, it is very important to discover the way identity of one group is perceived by the other. Poland is the closest neighbour of Ukraine in the European Union. Therefore, it is extremely important to understand how Ukraine is presented in Poland. Speaking in sociological

terms, if Ukraine could be considered as one group and Poland as another, it is worth exploring how the Ukrainian collective identity is perceived by Poland.

Any type of interaction is impossible without communication and media that make this communication possible<sup>3</sup>. Writing that medium is the message, Marshal McLuhan presents such different types of media as spoken word, written word, roads and routes, numbers, clothing, housing, money, weapon etc<sup>4</sup>. This paper is limited to the written word, a traditional type of mass-communication, namely opinion-making weekly magazines in Poland. For this analysis five of the most popular Polish weekly magazines were chosen: “Gość Niedzielny” (The Sunday Guest), “Polityka” (Politics), “Newsweek Polska”, “wSieci” (In the Web) and “Wprost” (Direct).

This paper begins with the introduction to the segment of the opinion-making press in Poland, then it explains the research methodology and methods of media analysis. After-

<sup>1</sup> A. Wilson, *Ukraine crisis. What it means for the West*, New Haven–London 2014, p. 98.

<sup>2</sup> J.E. Stets, P.J. Burke, *Identity theory and social identity theory*, “Social Psychology Quarterly”, Vol. 63 (2000), No. 3, p. 224–237.

<sup>3</sup> D. McQuail, *McQuail's mass communication theory*, Los Angeles 2007, p. 55.

<sup>4</sup> M. McLuhan, *Understanding media. The extensions of man*, London–New York 2002, p. 83–98.

wards it presents a brief analysis of the existing theories and concepts which refer to the problem of Ukrainian identity and their relevance/irrelevance to the results discovered from the analysis of Polish opinion-making press. In the summary, research into the national identity in the perception of foreign mass media is used to clarify various aspects of the identity-making process in the state whose identity is researched and disclose important issues of international communication.

### Polish opinion-making press

The segment of opinion-making press occupies a significant place on the Polish media market. The notion of “opinion-making press” (*prasa opinii, prasa opiniotwórcza*) is widespread both in Polish society and media studies. The *Encyclopedia of knowledge about press*, edited by Juliana Maślanka, provides the following definition: “Opinion-making press comments on events with the purpose of forming public opinion and attitudes”<sup>5</sup>. In turn, Tomasz Mileczarek articulates the attributes of the opinion-making press, which are as follows: opinion-making editorial board, domination of the opinion-shaping or “publicistic” (Pol. *publicystyczny*) style, and content focused on the socio-political, cultural, and sometimes literary problems<sup>6</sup>.

Also, opinion-making press interprets reality making people think, ask and answer questions, while informative press just tells news<sup>7</sup>. Zbigniew Bauer explains that, contrary to informative journalism, which only provides new information about the world, opinion-making press deepens this knowledge, stipulating an intellectual and emotional reaction to the presented facts<sup>8</sup>.

The *Encyclopedia of knowledge about press* divides the opinion-making press into socio-cultural and socio-political periodicals<sup>9</sup>. Hence, Tomasz Mielczarek assures that opinion-making press is “the tangible evidence of the intellectual activity of the Poles”<sup>10</sup>.

Agnieszka Kula rightly admits that nowadays with the development of Information and Communication Technologies new challenges have emerged before the printed press as well. As daily press does not serve as the source of actual and up-to-date information, it needs to attract readers by offering them an analytical point of view and comments on the events. Therefore, the opinion-making press could be represented by broadsheet newspapers, serious smaller-format newspapers, ambitious weeklies, intellectual magazines with lesser frequency, etc.<sup>11</sup> However, the daily press has been considered as less durable and continuous media than, for

<sup>5</sup> *Encyklopedia wiedzy o prasie*, ed. J. Maślanka, Wrocław 1976, p. 179.

<sup>6</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Współczesna polska prasa opinii* [Modern Polish opinion-making press], „Rocznik Historii Prasy Polskiej” [Yearbook of the history of the Polish press], Vol. 16 (2013), No 1, p. 79–102.

<sup>7</sup> A. Kula, *Opewnych zasadach sztuki publicystycznej w prasie opiniotwórczej. Temporalność i argumentacyjność* [On some principles of publicistic art in the opinion-making press. Temporality and argumentation], „Poznańskie Studia Polonistyczne. Seria Językoznawcza” [Polish language studies in Poznań. Linguistic series], Vol. 20 (2013), No. 1, p. 3.

<sup>8</sup> Z. Bauer, *Gatunki dziennikarskie* [Journalistic genres] [in:] *Dziennikarstwo i świat mediów* [Journalism and the world of media], ed. Z. Bauer, E. Chudziński, Kraków 2012, p. 263.

<sup>9</sup> J. Maślanka, *Encyklopedia...* op. cit., p. 179.

<sup>10</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Monopol, pluralizm, koncentracja. Środki komunikowania masowego w Polsce w latach 1989–2006* [Monopolies, pluralism, concentration. Means of mass communicating in Poland in 1989–2007], Warszawa 2007, p. 150–151.

<sup>11</sup> A. Kula, *Media opiniotwórcze – próba definicji* [Opinion-making media. An attempt at definition] [in:] *Przeobrażenia w języku i komunikacji medialnej na przełomie XX i XXI wieku* [Transformations in the language and media communication at the turn of the 21st century], ed. M. Karwatowska, A. Siwiec, Chełm 2010, p. 287.

instance, opinion-making weeklies<sup>12</sup>. In addition, Mielczarek still considers even serious qualitative Polish daily press as informative and opinion-making but not fully opinion-making<sup>13</sup>. Moreover, in his book *Report about the death of Polish newspapers* Mielczarek clearly presents an insightful analysis of different factors which have been not in favour of the daily press in Poland. They led to the decline of the popularity of the daily press among readers, the loss of the status of “cultural value”, and the reduction of the daily press “to the commodity distributed in the same way as soap, mayonnaise and washing powder”<sup>14</sup>. Another Polish scholar Iwona Hofman also admits that the segment of magazines in opinion-making press is characterized by a more stable financial and publishing situation and possession of stable target groups – the well-educated middle and upper classes<sup>15</sup>. In comparison to the daily press, the segment of magazines was more resistant to the changes in conjuncture. Due to its wider commercial and promotional capabilities, this segment managed to hold top positions among the Polish press.

Therefore, in Poland, the crucial role among opinion-making press is played by opinion weeklies (*tygodniki opinii*). Krzysztof Podemski argues that opinion weeklies are “the most optimal form of the public discourse exposure”<sup>16</sup>.

His argument is based on the following core reasons:

1. The representatives of the symbolic elites, the best pundits and commentators, political leaders and intellectuals (foreign and domestic) write for the weeklies.
2. Weekly magazines gain relatively wide readership; they have high circulations and are read by hundreds of thousands people.
3. Texts of the weeklies are read and cited in other media.
4. The content of the articles in opinion weeklies are read and discussed in intellectual and opinion-shaping circles.

Therefore for the analysis of the image of Ukrainian identity during Euromaidan five weekly magazines were selected: “Polityka”, “Wprost”, “Newsweek Polska”, “Gość Niedzielny” and “wSieci”.

Already in 1989 the first place was occupied by the weekly magazine “Polityka” which had its record circulation of 426 thousand copies that year. In the analysed period, “Polityka” also had a high sale index: over 125 thousand copies in 2013 and over 121 thousand copies in 2014<sup>17</sup>.

Mielczarek admits that the interests of “Polityka” have not changed for many years. For example, in the beginning of the 1990s, the problems of the political transformations were

<sup>12</sup> A. Kaliszewski, K. Wolny-Zmorzyński, *Rodzaje i gatunki dziennikarskie. Próba ustaleń genologicznych* [Journalistic kinds and genres. An attempt at genology] [in:] *W kręgu “Merkurysza Polskiego”. Studia i szkice w 350-lecie prasy polskiej* [In the circle of *Polish Mercurius*. Studies and essays for the 350th anniversary of the Polish press], ed. K. Woźniakowski, G. Wrona, T. Sierny, Katowice 2012, p. 125.

<sup>13</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Monopol, pluralizm,...* op.cit., p. 80–81.

<sup>14</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Raport o śmierci polskich gazet* [Report on the death of Polish newspapers], Warszawa 2012, p. 184.

<sup>15</sup> I. Hofman, *Rynek mediów w Polsce. Stan obecny. Próba oceny perspektyw rozwoju* [Media market in Poland. The present state. An assessment attempt of developmental perspectives], “Media dawne i współczesne” [Media, old and modern], Vol. 4 (2009), p. 71–82.

<sup>16</sup> K. Podemski, *Świat w polskich tygodnikach opinii* [World in Polish opinion-making weeklies], „Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Sociologiczny”, Issue 3 (2011), p. 241–261.

<sup>17</sup> “Wprost” o 72% w dół, a “Polityka” – o 32%. Sprzedaż tygodników opinii od 2005 roku (raport) [“Wprost” down by 72%, “Polityka” – by 32%. The sales of opinion-making weeklies since 2005 (report)], <http://www.wirtualnemedial.pl/arttykul/wprost-o-72-proc-w-dol-a-polityka-o-32-proc-sprzedaz-tygodnikow-opinii-od-2005-roku-raport> [accessed: 10.09.2015].

illustrated on the pages of the magazine. Then, in the middle of the decade, the questions of economics were most widely analysed by the journalists. Then, at the turn of the century, journalists were more focused on the issues of science and culture. During the following years slightly more attention was paid to the questions of history and society.

The role of “Polityka” as opinion-making press is clearly illustrated by the fact that it shows one of the highest sale indicators on the Polish media market. Mielczarek admits that it has had the great influence on Polish public opinion since the times of Polish People’s Republic<sup>18</sup>. Ideologically “Polityka” is a leftist-liberal magazine. The audience of “Polityka” are largely people with higher than average incomes, living in big cities, mostly men. Very often the readers of “Polityka” also read “Wprost” and “Newsweek Polska”.

Therefore, the second magazine which can be considered as opinion-making press is the weekly magazine “Wprost”. The first issue of “Wprost” appeared on 1 December 1982. The first circulation of the issue was only 30 thousand, but very quickly the magazine gained new readers. In 1996 the circulation was 338 thousand copies, 238 thousand of which were sold. In 2005 the circulation was 278 thousand copies, and 177 thousand were sold; in 2006 the sales amounted to 145 thousand copies<sup>19</sup>. Afterwards, the sales decreased, reaching only about 62 thousand copies in 2013 and 58 thousand copies in 2014<sup>20</sup>.

The readership of “Wprost” are young people under the age of 45. The readers are

interested both in the Polish situation (86%) and international affairs (83%). As for political preferences and ideological orientation, in the 1990s “Wprost” was perceived more as a liberal magazine (42%), as well as centrist and right-winged (25%). Nowadays “Wprost” tends to be more centrist<sup>21</sup>.

The third opinion-making magazine among socio-political weeklies is “Newsweek Polska”. Its first issue was published in September 2001. Because of the intensive promotion, 400 thousand copies of the first issue were sold. During its first year, the circulation of “Newsweek” was 492 thousand copies, 325 thousand of which were sold. In 2002 the circulation was 411 thousand, and 251 thousand copies were sold. During the following years the interest in the magazine decreased, and in 2006 only 138 thousand copies were sold. Various marketing tricks were then applied to increase the sales<sup>22</sup>. However, these measures did not help to increase the sales, which never reached the first year’s indexes. For instance, in 2013–2014 the average sales equalled 126 and 118 thousand copies respectively<sup>23</sup>. It was assumed that “Newsweek Polska” would fail. However, it found new readers: the young people who had not been interested in socio-political press before. The surveys showed that 34% readers of “Newsweek” are between 15 and 24 years old<sup>24</sup>.

The Catholic weekly “Gość Niedzielny” occupies a distinguished place among the opinion-making press with its long tradition of publishing. “Gość Niedzielny” has been published since 1923 by the Metropolitan Curia in Katowice<sup>25</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Współczesna polska prasa...*, op. cit. s. 88.

<sup>19</sup> Ibidem, p. 89.

<sup>20</sup> “Wprost” o 72% w dół..., op. cit.

<sup>21</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Współczesna polska prasa...*, op. cit., p. 92.

<sup>22</sup> Ibidem, p. 93.

<sup>23</sup> “Wprost” o 72% w dół..., op. cit.

<sup>24</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Współczesna polska prasa...*, op. cit., s. 94.

<sup>25</sup> G. Łęcicki, *Media katolickie w III Rzeczypospolitej (1989–2009)* [Catholic media in the 3rd Polish Republic (1989–2009)], „*Kultura. Media. Teologia*” [Culture. Media. Theology], Vol 2 (2010), p. 112–122.

The editor-in-chief is father Marek Gancarczyk. The editorial board consists of staff journalists and collaborators, including scholars, poets, writers, politicians, and cultural activists. The readers are usually older people, living in small towns and villages, without high incomes<sup>26</sup>. It is worth admitting that “Gość Niedzielny” has had the highest circulation and sale index in Poland during recent years. In 2012–2014 the average sales of “Gość Niedzielny” exceeded 141 thousand copies yearly<sup>27</sup>.

Among the conservative press, the weekly magazine “wSieci” is very popular. It was founded in 2012 by the journalists who had quitted another right-winged magazine “Uważam Rze: Inaczej Pisane” [I think that: Written differently]<sup>28</sup>. Even though “wSieci” has been around for only 3 years it already holds top sales positions competing with “Wprost” and “Newsweek”. In 2012 the average sales index of “wSieci” reached over 119 thousand copies, then it decreased to the level of 70–77 thousand copies<sup>29</sup>.

In general, not only weekly magazines in Poland are considered to be opinion-making press but also such intellectual non-academic magazines as “Nowa Res Publica”, “Arcana”, “Znak”, “Więź”, “Krytyka Polityczna” and others. For this analysis, however, the most popular weekly magazines were chosen because of their frequency and varied ideological representation, providing representative material for analysis.

## Methodology and methods of data analysis

The primary method is the traditional content analysis alongside the discursive interpretation

of the patterns of Ukrainian identity discovered in analysed samples. This approach opens an opportunity to explore a wider spectrum of social and cultural ideas of the text<sup>30</sup>. Mixed methods of qualitative and quantitative content analysis were used, since purely descriptive data are not relevant without a deeper deliberation on the meanings provided in the analysed units<sup>31</sup>.

Samples were analysed with the help of the software QDA Miner v. 4.1.22 (Trial version). As a foundation, a vocabulary of keywords was created. The vocabulary served as the book of codes containing categories and subcategories referring to each part of the text. For coding, two main categories of *supranational identity* and *national identity* were established. These categories were divided into two subcategories each: supranational identity was divided into *European identity* and *Eastern Slavic identity*; whereas national identity was divided into *ethnic identity* and *civic identity*. In turn, each subcategory was divided into codes: European identity was divided into *materialistic* and *idealistic* codes, while Eastern Slavic identity was divided into *pro-Russian* and *post-Soviet* codes; ethnic identity was divided into *nationalistic* and *cultural* codes, and civic identity was divided into *political* and *axiological* codes. We have thus derived “the tree of the codes”. The meaning of the particular elements of the tree and the way of retrieving it will be explained in the results. The codes were not created *ad hoc*, they were based on existing theoretical research on the Ukrainian identity, and the textual parts were coded after carefully reading the content. Therefore, the coding demonstrates the main

<sup>26</sup> K. Podemski, *Świat w polskich...*, op. cit., p. 245.

<sup>27</sup> “Wprost” o 72% w dół..., op. cit.

<sup>28</sup> T. Mielczarek, *Współczesna polska prasa...*, op. cit., p. 99–100.

<sup>29</sup> “Wprost” o 72% w dół..., op. cit.

<sup>30</sup> J. Bainbridge, *Textual analysis and media research* [in:] *Media and journalism. New approaches to theory and practice*, eds. J. Bainbridge, N. Goc, L. Tynan, Melbourne 2011, p. 236.

<sup>31</sup> W. Pisarek, *Analiza zawartości prasy* [Analysis of the content of the press], Kraków 1983, p. 29.

patterns of identities assigned to Ukraine and discovered in the analysed samples. The functions of QDA such as coding frequency and code occurrence in the cases were used in order to obtain the data. The content analysis conducted with the help of the software enabled us to discover qualitative results in each analysed unit alongside measuring the occurrences of a particular code without manually counting the keywords<sup>32</sup>.

The selection of articles was based on the criteria of time period and genres of journalism. Thus, the texts were chosen from between the first report about Euromaidan and the reports about the Russian occupation of Crimea (excluding). As a result, the period encompasses the articles written between November/December 2013 and February/March 2014. As for genres, those articles were analysed which provided not only informative reports but the evaluation and interpretation of the Ukrainian events with the ambition of constructing public opinion, i.e., essays, problem reports, interviews. Hence, 67 samples were analysed: 16 articles from the “Gość Niedzielny” magazine, 16 from “Polityka”, 9 from “Wprost”, 13 from “Newsweek Polska”, and 13 from “wSieci”.

### Supranational identity

Social scientists link the presence of supranational identity with the sort of inferiority complexes inherited from the post-Soviet legacy<sup>33</sup>. In

Ukraine supranational identity is present mostly in two vectors, European and Eastern-Slavic. Melnykowska, Schweickert and Kostiuchenko confirm that in several post-communist states the European identity prevails<sup>34</sup>. Hence, it led them to the membership in EU or NATO, or at least membership negotiations. On the other hand, the authors acknowledge that such states as Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia have been cultivating the Eastern Slavic supranational identity for a long time after the dissolution of the USSR. The Eastern Slavic identity, which promotes the myth of common origins of these three nations, is a comfortable choice of supranational identity for the people who feel neither Asian nor European<sup>35</sup>. Thus, supranational identity is the combination of foreign political orientation and the complex of certain values and ideas connected with a certain civilizational tradition.

### European identity

The subcategory of *European identity*, which occurred in all five samples, was divided into materialistic and idealistic codes. The “materialistic identity” code was retrieved with the keywords and phrases which described the Ukrainians whose imagination about Europe was limited to the sphere of wealthy and flourishing economy (e.g., a desire to be included in the European institutional structures, which might, for instance, waive visas to EU and help

<sup>32</sup> To learn more how different functions of QDA Miner could be applied in media research, see: J. Jura, K. Kałużyńska, *Obraz obcokrajowców i imigrantów w polskich mediach tradycyjnych i internetowych* [Image of foreigners and immigrants in the Polish traditional and online media] [in:] *Imigranci o wysokich kwalifikacjach na polskim rynku pracy. Raport z badań 2014–2015* [Highly qualified immigrants on the Polish job market. The 2014–2015 research report], ed. J. Konieczna-Salamantin, Warszawa 2015.

<sup>33</sup> M. Riabchuk, *Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’. National identity and postcommunist transition* [in:] *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 45 (2012), Issues 3–4, p. 439–446; T. Kuzio, *Nationalism, identity and civil society in Ukraine. Understanding the Orange Revolution* [in:] *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, Vol. 43 (2010), Issue 4, p. 283–296.

<sup>34</sup> I. Melnykowska, R. Schweickert, T. Kostiuchenko, *Balancing national uncertainty and foreign orientation. Identity building and the role of political parties in Post-Orange Ukraine*, “Europe–Asia Studies”, Vol. 63 (2011), No. 6, p. 1055–1072.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 1057.

Table 1. Supranational European identity of Ukraine in Polish weekly magazines (total percentage of coding frequency by case)

	“Newsweek”	“Polityka”	“Wprost”	“wSieci”	“GN”
Materialistic (European)	6,7%	6,7%	5,0%	6,7%	1,7%
Idealistic (European)	8,3%	16,7%	13,3%	18,3%	16,7%

Source: own research

conduct economic reforms). In contrast, the idealistic code was retrieved using the keywords indicating the values of democracy, freedom, justice, and cultural or historical adherence to Europe (e.g., culture, mentality, democracy, human rights, the absence of corruption, “normal” life, freedom, freedom of the press, equal rights). Hence, the results of this query demonstrate that the European identity of the Ukrainians is represented in all analysed samples more in its idealistic variant than in the materialistic one (see Table 1). In many cases, the Ukrainians are represented without the entire awareness of what Europe really is. For instance, the journalists often described the participants of Euromaidan as people who were not conscious of the economic or political details of what they were fighting for. The next passage is very common in all analysed samples: “The Ukrainians are not interested at all in what is written in the Association agreement with EU, and nobody knows if Ukraine will be for the European Union only a marketing outlet, or if new opportunities will open as well. They only have the naive faith that Europe is closer to them”.

### ***Eastern Slavic identity***

Eastern Slavic identity was introduced by Stephen Shulman as one of the “national identity complexes” in Ukraine<sup>36</sup>. It should be ad-

mitted that Shulman does not distinguish supranational from national identity; he links Eastern Slavic to the common scope of national identity problems in Ukraine. Although Shulman does not disentangle supranational from national identity, the attributes he provides for the Eastern Slavic identity complex clearly point out its main supranational character. Shulman confirms that the Eastern Slavic ethnic identity maintains the imperial Russian and Soviet narrative of common history and brotherhood of the three “Eastern Slavic nations” of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

The Eastern Slavic identity was interpreted by Mykola Riabchuk as “little-Russianism”<sup>37</sup> – an identity which is characterized by clear adherence to Russia or by sentiments for the Soviet Union and Soviet mentality. The peculiar way of corrupted political and social environments which are “rooted in post-Soviet political and business culture”<sup>38</sup> also could be treated in terms of Eastern Slavic identity. Thus, in this research, the subcategory of Eastern Slavic identity was divided into the pro-Russian and post-Soviet identity codes.

During Euromaidan foreign media, including Polish, did not pay much attention to post-Soviet or pro-Russian moods: the percentage of the total coding is relatively low. The occurrence of these codes depended on the edito-

<sup>36</sup> S. Shulman, *The contours of civic and ethnic national identification in Ukraine*, „Europe-Asia Studies” 2004, Vol. 56, No. 1, p. 35–56.

<sup>37</sup> M. Riabchuk, *Ukraine’s ‘muddling through’...*, op. cit., p. 442.

<sup>38</sup> A. Wilson, *Ukraine crisis. What it means for the West*, New Haven–London 2014, p. 70.

Table 2. Supranational Eastern Slavic identity of Ukraine in Polish weekly magazines (total percentage of code frequency by case)

	“Newsweek”	“Polityka”	“Wprost”	“wSieci”	“GN”
Pro-Russian	0,0%	31,3%	0,0%	6,3%	15,6%
Post-Soviet	21,9%	15,6%	0,0%	6,3%	3,1%

Source: own research

rial attitudes towards the Ukrainian events, i.e., whether the journalists were tasked to write not only about the central events in Kyiv and pro-European Western Ukraine but about the Eastern part of the state as well. The pro-Russian code was retrieved by the keywords and phrases which described the actions of the former president Yanukovich, Ukrainian oligarchs and their relations with Russia, or the Eastern Ukrainian people’s geopolitical preferences. In turn, the Post-Soviet code refers more to people’s mentality. It was used when the journalists presented the Ukrainians as unfree or uncertain about their national identity or as people feeling nostalgia for USSR.

The data clarify that the issue of Eastern Slavic identity was not represented in all cases. The magazine “Wprost” omitted this category entirely. In “Polityka” and “Gość Niedzielny”, the pro-Russian code is found in the articles about the pro-Russian orientation of political and oligarchic elites. “Newsweek Polska” dedicated a few articles to the peripheral localities, therefore it demonstrated a relatively high percentage in presenting the post-Soviet code in the Eastern Slavic identity (see table 2).

### National identity

National identity is a multifaceted and complicated phenomenon, described in numerous

academic works<sup>39</sup>. In the social sciences, national identity is viewed as a part of an individual’s social identity and as a collective phenomenon which organizes people into national groups<sup>40</sup>.

In this study, the national identity of Ukraine seen by the Polish press will be examined according to two concepts of civic and ethnic identity based on the main fundamental ideas proposed by Anthony Smith. Smith delineates five profound ideas which frame the notion of national identity. The first one is a historic territory, or homeland, the second are common myths and historical memories, the third is common culture. The first three are more likely to characterize the ethnic pattern of national identity. The following two, such as common legal rights and duties for all members and a common economy with territorial mobility for members, refer to the civic component of national identity<sup>41</sup>.

### Ethnic identity

Ethnic identity is regarded mostly as a continuity of cultural and historical patterns which organize certain groups into one national unity. Now researchers have ranged ethnic identity from simple self-identification labels to complex concepts of one’s ethnic identity according to orientation and attachments to one’s ethnic

<sup>39</sup> See, e.g., A. Smith, *National identity*, Harmondsworth 1991; *Nationalism*, eds. J. Hutchinson, A. Smith, Oxford 1994; B. Anderson, *Imagined communities. Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism*, London 1991.

<sup>40</sup> K.V. Korostelina, *Mapping national identity narratives in Ukraine*, “Nationalities Papers. The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity”, Vol. 41 (2013), No. 2, p. 293–315.

<sup>41</sup> A. Smith, *National identity*, op. cit., p. 14.



Table 3. National ethnic identity of Ukraine in Polish weekly magazines (total percentage of code frequency by case)

	“Newsweek”	“Polityka”	“Wprost”	“wSieci”	“GN”
Nationalistic (National)	6,3%	12,5%	6,3%	4,7%	1,6%
Cultural (National)	9,4%	15,6%	10,9%	17,2%	15,6%

Source: own research

heritage<sup>42</sup>. Overall, ethnic identity emphasizes the primordial values: the special role of the national culture, history, the common place where a person feels his or her sense of the self and can promote their sub-group to the exclusion of other groups<sup>43</sup>.

For this study the subcategory of ethnic identity was divided into *nationalistic* and *cultural* codes. This division was made based on the most popular patterns of describing the Ukrainian national ethnic identity in the samples. The nationalistic identity code was based on such keywords and patterns in the text as: radical nationalists, Banderists (Pol. *banderowcy*), Stepan Bandera, Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Pol. *Ukraińska armia powstańcza*), fascists etc. It is worth admitting that the presence of above-mentioned keywords in the samples did not always mean the description of the nationalistic identity. In many cases, the narrative of Banderists and fascists was used in order to reinforce the stereotype present in Polish society about the Ukrainians as radical nationalists. Likewise, the symbols of Ukrainian Insurgent Army were presented in the discourse of the Ukrainian struggle for independence from Soviet Russia. In these cases such text fragments were not coded as “nationalistic”. However, the average perception of the Ukrainians during Euromaidan as

nationalists was very high. It should be noted, that people with black and red flags (the symbol of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army) were treated as radical nationalists. Also journalists very often emphasized that the presence of the symbols of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army such as its flag and greeting motto (*Glory to Ukraine! To heroes glory!*) are incompatible with the European values.

On the other hand, cultural code represents the perception of the Ukrainian identity in the discourse of national cultural values, religion, common historical symbols, or contemporary popular culture, which consolidate people. As the evidence demonstrates the cultural Ukrainian identity prevails over the nationalistic one in all five cases (see table 3). In all analysed weekly magazines, significant attention was paid to the cultural component of Euromaidan protests, especially the role of the intellectual, cultural elites and the clergy for the demonstration of the parallels between Euromaidan and such historical narratives as Cossacks, which represented the value of freedom.

### **Civic identity**

Civic identity is based not on the ethnic attachment but on the group membership of residence and tolerance to the other ethnic groups living in

<sup>42</sup> A.J. Umaña-Taylor, *Ethnic identity* [in:] *Handbook of identity theory and research*, eds. S.J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx, V.L. Vignoles, New York 2011, p. 791–809.

<sup>43</sup> H.E Hansen, V.L. Hesli, *National identity. Civic, ethnic, hybrid, and atomised individuals*, “Europe–Asia Studies”, Vol. 61 (2009), No. 1, p. 1–28.

Table 4. National civic identity of Ukraine in Polish weekly magazines (total percentage of code frequency by case)

	“Newsweek”	“Polityka”	“Wprost”	“wSieci”	“GN”
Political (Civic)	5,5%	7,3%	0,0%	14,5%	0,0%
Axiological (Civic)	9,1%	16,4%	1,8%	16,4%	29,1%

Source: own research

the state<sup>44</sup>. As Hart, Richardson, and Wilkenfeld assert, civic identity is closely related to such nations as citizenship and civic participation. For the framework of this study, the following definition of civic identity is accepted: “A sense of civic identity leads people to volunteer to help their neighbours and their neighbours’ children, vote in local and national elections, join the military and risk their lives to protect national interests, and pay taxes to provide for fellow citizens who are unable to earn enough to pay for housing, food, and medical care”<sup>45</sup>.

In the research of the Ukrainian identity in the Polish opinion-making press, the subcategory of civic identity was divided into *political* and *axiological* codes. The political code of civic identity represents in this study the description of the Ukrainians as people aware of their rights with a strong sense of citizenship and responsibility for the state they live in. As seen from the data, the proportion of this components is not very high (see Table 4). To clarify, the passages containing such key phrases as “the new Ukraine is being born on the Maidan”, “they are fighting for new independent Ukraine” were coded as “political identity”. In brief, the code illustrates the civic identity of the Ukrainians with institutional adherence to the state.

The axiological code in the subcategory of civic identity prevails over the political one. This code was understood as the complex of civic values which Ukrainian people were

demonstrating. The main keywords in the analysis of the samples were the following: civic society, human rights, discipline in the state, absence of corruption, self-organization during Euromaidan, cooperation between all people without language and ethnic differences etc. This code is very similar to the political code, but the difference lies in the description of the ideals and ideas of civic society during Euromaidan. For instance, such fragments as “these people do not take bribes and do not give them”, “they do not throw litter on the streets and maintain the order in their staircases”, “they gave their lives for new Ukraine”, “they want clear and transparent authority” were coded as axiological. The data demonstrate that the axiological code in the description of the Ukrainian identity prevails over the political one.

## Conclusion

The research of the press using data analysis software enables one to work with large amount of material. Also, the software helps to obtain relevant data for the sociological analysis of the press. This paper demonstrates how the issues of identity could be discovered from journalistic writings only, containing no sociological data.

The image of Ukraine during the public protests called Euromaidan was presented in the Polish press in two categories: of supranational and national identity. The European supranational identity, both in its materialistic and

<sup>44</sup> S. Shulman, *The contours of civic...*, op. cit., p. 35–37.

<sup>45</sup> D. Hart, C. Richardson, B. Wilkenfeld, *Civic identity*, op. cit., p. 771.

idealistic codes, occurred with an almost equal frequency to the national ethnic and national civic identities. However, the idealistic code in presenting Ukrainians as Europeans noticeably prevailed over the materialistic code. It is particularly visible in the case of the weekly magazine "Gość Niedzielny" with the percentage of 16.7% of idealistic code vs 1.7% of materialistic one.

The subcategory of Eastern Slavic identity also occurred in the samples, though not in all cases. The description of the Ukrainian reality in terms of pro-Russian and post-Soviet alongside European is clearly vivid in three magazines: "Polityka", "Newsweek", and "Gość Niedzielny". This could be explained by the thematic specifics of the journalistic writings which encompassed not only the reports from Euromaidan but also from other spheres and part of Ukrainian life during the Euromaidan period, such as economy, the description of ruling elites and people living in Eastern Ukraine.

The national identity slightly prevailed over the supranational identity in the representation of Ukraine during the Euromaidan period. Ukraine was presented mostly in the positive image of a conscious nation aware of its national identity and civic responsibility. Especially, it is

clearly illuminated in the magazines "Polityka" and "wSieci", where the indexes of the cultural code of ethnic identity and both codes of civic identity are higher in comparison to other samples. However, the description of the Ukrainians as Banderists and radical nationalists was also found in all five magazines. Surprisingly, the code of nationalistic Ukrainian identity occurred most frequently in the liberal "Polityka" and less frequently in the conservative "Gość Niedzielny". It means that unsolved historical problems still influence the image of Ukraine in contemporary Poland, regardless if ideological orientations.

In general, sharp socio-political situations and turning points in Ukraine, such as Euromaidan, caused the emergence of the image of homogeneous national identity of Ukraine in the Polish press. Thus, the state was presented mostly as an organized society with a fully expressed European supranational identity. It means that the supranational idea of Europe and the implication of European values in the general identity discourse leads to the perception of Ukraine as a homogeneous society. On the other hand, ethnic features based on nationalistic components do not act in favour of the image of Ukraine abroad.